Venezuela: Trump's first foreign misadventure?
The U.S. military is massing off the Venezuelan coast. The official line: counter-narcotics. The reality: regime change preparations. Grenada or Somalia beckons?
The United States has assembled an invasion-ready strike group off the coast of Venezuela. Washington insists the operation is about fighting drug cartels, but the scale of the naval and air deployment suggests a much larger objective: regime change.
The amphibious assault ship USS Iwo Jima is at the heart of the force, carrying around 4,000 Marines. Two San Antonio-class amphibious transport docks add another 6,000 Marines to the picture, while eight Arleigh Burke-class destroyers provide air defense and long-range Tomahawk strike capacity. Offshore, the nuclear-powered attack submarine USS Newport News lurks in the depths, adding another precision-strike option. The formation also includes the littoral combat ship USS Minneapolis-Saint Paul, while dozens of helicopters and ten F-35 stealth fighters have already staged forward to Puerto Rico. Taken together, this is not a counternarcotics task force but a full-spectrum invasion package.
Drones and the Battlefield Environment
One major difference between Venezuela in 2025 and Grenada in 1983 is the role of drones. Venezuela has been steadily building its drone capabilities through cooperation with Iran. Mohajer-class drones, capable of reconnaissance and precision strike, are already in service, with assembly lines active at Maracay. These systems have been observed patrolling coastal zones as the U.S. fleet approaches.
The country also enforces restrictions on civilian drones, a sign of how seriously it treats this domain. There are reports of emerging local assembly and small-scale production, though evidence of large-scale FPV swarms like those seen in Ukraine remains limited. What is certain, however, is that even a modest UAV capability increases the vulnerability of U.S. lodgments, airfields, and convoys. Armed drones and FPVs can harass helicopters, interdict supply lines, and provide constant overwatch to militia ambush teams. In practice, this transforms any invasion into a prolonged and attritional fight rather than a swift, decisive blow.
The Most Likely Outcomes
With this context, the U.S. faces three broad pathways.
The first is a decapitation and blockade strategy, relying on precision strikes against command centers, ports, and critical infrastructure. Special Operations raids would follow, combined with a maritime blockade to strangle the regime’s revenue streams. This option minimizes U.S. exposure on the ground and lowers the chance of protracted insurgency. At present, the probability of such an approach is around 32 percent.
The second is the classic amphibious lodgment and counterinsurgency model, in which Marines seize ports and airfields, push inland toward Caracas, and attempt to install new governance. This is the path U.S. force structure currently appears to favor, but it carries the highest risks. Armed drones and militias would erode U.S. logistics and morale, and the probability of the operation degenerating into a Somalia-style urban insurgency is high—around 62 percent.
The third option is limited strikes followed by a pause, in which the White House claims victory against “cartel targets” without attempting to hold terrain. This would reduce risks but also fail to achieve regime change, and sits at roughly a 28 percent likelihood.
Overall, the chance of rapid regime collapse similar to Grenada has fallen to just 18 percent. The more likely trajectory is an occupation that bogs down, followed by political pressure to withdraw. By the ninety-day mark, the probability of the U.S. pulling out without achieving its maximal objectives is now estimated at 42 percent.
The Ring of Neighbours
The battlefield does not stop at Venezuela’s borders. Neighbouring countries are already shaping the strategic environment.
Colombia is the most exposed, sharing a long and porous frontier with Venezuela. President Gustavo Petro has publicly condemned U.S. strikes, and Bogotá is expected to tighten border security while simultaneously bracing for refugee flows. The Arauca and Apure regions will be flashpoints as tens of thousands attempt to flee fighting. There remains a small but real possibility that Colombia will provide quiet intelligence or airspace access to the U.S., but the more likely scenario is public opposition, border militarisation, and diplomatic campaigning at the United Nations.
Brazil has already voiced concern that the U.S. naval deployment risks destabilising the hemisphere. Brasília prefers diplomacy and mediation and may attempt to bring the crisis into BRICS or UN channels. Brazil is unlikely to support U.S. military action directly; instead, it will play the role of regional mediator, a position that allows it to assert leadership without committing forces.
Guyana faces its own direct security risk. With a long-running territorial dispute over the Essequibo region, and oil infrastructure vulnerable to harassment, Georgetown is expected to seek immediate international protection. Appeals to the UN, the Commonwealth, and CARICOM are almost guaranteed, and there is a significant chance of Venezuelan naval posturing or harassment near Guyana’s offshore platforms. This is the neighbour most at risk of direct spillover incidents.
CARICOM states are divided. Some will call for restraint and humanitarian aid, while others may quietly grant the U.S. overflight rights or logistical support. The refugee burden will strain smaller islands, with the Dominican Republic and Trinidad & Tobago particularly exposed.
Cuba and Nicaragua are already in Venezuela’s corner. Both governments have pledged solidarity and are likely to funnel advisors, technicians, and possibly drone components into the country. Open military deployment is unlikely, but clandestine support is almost certain.
Trinidad & Tobago will primarily face the humanitarian dimension. As one of the closest safe havens, Port of Spain may become a hub for refugee processing, humanitarian airlifts, and naval patrol coordination. Domestic unrest could follow if refugee flows are large.
The Bottom Line
The United States is not preparing to board drug boats; it is preparing for a regime change operation in Venezuela. The problem is that the terrain, the urban density, and the drone threat make this a poor fit for a quick, decisive operation. Instead, it risks becoming a protracted conflict where every convoy, every helicopter, and every patrol is under constant threat from cheap FPVs and militias with persistent UAV overwatch.
The neighbours will not sit still. Colombia braces for refugees while condemning Washington, Brazil maneuvers diplomatically, Guyana appeals for protection, and Cuba and Nicaragua channel covert support. The operation begins as a test of U.S. power projection, but within weeks it could become a regional crisis pulling in almost every state in northern South America and the Caribbean.
The verdict is stark: Venezuela 2025 is far more likely to look like Somalia than Grenada.
Predicted Timeline:
D0: SEAD + TLAM on IADS/C2 → P(SEAD success)=0.60.
D1–D3: Amphibious & helo lodgment attempts; highest vulnerability to drone strikes. Use of PR-based F-35s in CAS.
D4–D10: If lodgment holds, attempts to build throughput; expect drone interdiction of logistics; increase in IED/cassette mine incidents.
D11–D30: Urban/COIN phase; drone-enabled guerrilla tactics proliferate; attrition rises; political costs escalate.
D31–D90: Most likely result is frozen/attritional conflict with call for negotiated exit or phased withdrawal.
Nailed it!