Putin’s Military Options Amid his Failure in Ukraine: A WOPR Intelligence Briefing
He has very little good options left.
I asked my WOPR AI planning and simulation model to fully research Putin’s options. It is not necessarily my view but the direct output (modified to make it easier to read)
I am not a war strategist, but I can make models. This is the outcome of 4 scenarios for Putin. It is not my words.
Introduction
After nearly four years of brutal war, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has ground into a strategic stalemate. Both sides have absorbed enormous losses – likely on the order of a million combined casualties (killed and wounded)brookings.edu – yet neither has achieved a decisive breakthrough. The conflict has devolved into a grueling war of attrition, with Russian forces dug into defensive lines and Ukrainian troops pressing a slow counteroffensive. President Vladimir Putin now faces a stark choice: continue the current protracted standoff, or escalate in a bid to break the deadlock. This briefing examines four potential scenarios for Putin’s next move – from maintaining the status quo in Ukraine to widening the war beyond Ukraine’s borders. Each scenario is analyzed for Putin’s motivations and triggers, operational feasibility, strategic objectives, likely Western/regional responses, and domestic political ramifications. Open-source intelligence indicators – including reports of pre-positioned sabotage teams, HUMINT (human intelligence) detection of troop movements, and the degradation of Russian fuel infrastructure from Ukrainian deep strikes – are integrated to gauge the warning signs and viability of each course of action.
Scenario 1: Continued Standoff in Ukraine (Status Quo)
Key Motivations and Triggers: In this scenario, Putin opts to “stay the course” in Ukraine – avoiding any dramatic new offensives or expansion of the war. The motivation is to wait out Ukraine and the West, betting that time and attrition will wear down Kyiv’s will and Western unity. Putin’s calculus is that Russia’s larger manpower and industrial base can endure a long war of attrition better than Ukraine, especially if U.S. or European support falters. He may also be hedging on political shifts in the West (for example, wavering support in the U.S. Congress or upcoming elections) to eventually limit aid to Ukraine. Absent any acute trigger for change – such as a major Ukrainian collapse or an existential threat to Russian gains – defaulting to the status quo allows Putin to avoid high-risk gambles while keeping pressure on Ukraine.
Operational Feasibility: Continuing the standoff is highly feasible for Russia. Its forces have constructed extensive defensive fortifications in occupied territories, and Ukrainian attacks, while persistent, remain relatively contained. The Russian military can maintain its current ops tempo of relentless shelling and drone/missile strikes without launching costly new offensives. Ammo and drone production have ramped up despite sanctions – by mid-2025, Russia was regularly launching “massed” salvos of drones and missiles averaging 370 munitions (triple the 2022 rate) roughly every weekrussiamatters.org. In July 2025 alone, Russian forces fired nearly 6,300 attack drones, a staggering increase from just 426 the previous Julyrussiamatters.org. These bombardments can continue punishing Ukraine’s infrastructure even if ground lines stagnate. However, Russia’s offensive capability is constrained by heavy losses in tanks and armored vehicles over the past year, which Moscow has sharply reduced usage of to conserve remaining stocksrussiamatters.org. This suggests an emphasis on defense and long-range strikes – a posture consistent with a protracted stalemate. Meanwhile, Ukrainian deep-strike capabilities are gradually eroding Russian logistics: Ukraine’s drone and missile attacks have disrupted an estimated 17–20% of Russia’s oil refining capacity, sparking fuel shortages and long gas station queues inside Russiaatlanticcouncil.orgatlanticcouncil.org. This ongoing degradation of Russian POL (petroleum, oil, lubricants) infrastructure could slowly strain Moscow’s military operations, but thus far Russia has managed to patch over the issues by rerouting supplies and downplaying the damage.
Infrared footage of a Russian oil depot ablaze after a reported Ukrainian drone strike (August 2025). Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign has disrupted up to one-fifth of Russia’s fuel refining capacity, causing domestic gasoline shortagesatlanticcouncil.orgatlanticcouncil.org. This logistical pressure contributes to Putin’s caution in launching new offensives.
Strategic Objectives: By prolonging the status quo, Putin’s objective is to freeze the conflict in place and make it a test of endurance. Holding existing territory (Crimea and parts of eastern/southern Ukraine) allows Russia to fortify its gains and integrate those regions administratively. Strategically, the Kremlin likely hopes that a drawn-out war will sap Western resolve – causing “Ukraine fatigue” among NATO populations and divisions among Kyiv’s supporters – eventually pressuring Ukraine into a unfavorable ceasefire. Putin may also use the time to rebuild combat power (through troop rotations, increased weapons production, and training of mobilized recruits) for future advantage. In the interim, Russia continues pursuing an “attrition strategy”: pounding Ukrainian cities and infrastructure with missiles and drones to break Ukraine’s economy and morale, while employing covert means to disrupt Western military aid. Notably, Russian intelligence units have been caught sabotaging supply lines in NATO countries during this stalemate. In one case, Polish authorities arrested a Russian spy ring that “monitored railway lines” and prepared sabotage actions to paralyze weapons deliveries to Ukrainetheguardian.com. Such incidents underscore Moscow’s ongoing hybrid warfare aimed at slowing Western arms transfers and paralyzing Ukrainian capabilities – all without overtly expanding the war. Through a combination of steady battlefield pressure, terror bombardment, and clandestine subversion, Putin’s strategic intent is to make the cost of continuing the war higher for Kyiv and its backers than for Moscow.
Predicted Western and Regional Responses: As long as Russia’s aggression remains confined to Ukraine, the Western response is likely to stay the course as well: continue providing military aid, economic support, and intelligence to Ukraine, but avoid direct military intervention. NATO countries will condemn Russian attacks and may incrementally increase sanctions or aid packages, yet they will also be wary of any steps that could provoke a wider war. In the scenario of a grinding stalemate, some Western voices may push for negotiations or a frozen conflict to halt the bloodshed, while Central-Eastern European allies (e.g. Poland, Baltics) will argue for doubling down on support to ensure Ukraine prevails. Overall, Allied unity could come under strain the longer the war drags on – for instance, U.S. domestic debates on funding the war have already been intensebrookings.edu – but so far Russia’s intransigence and atrocities have galvanized the West to “stay in the fight.” Regionally, NATO’s eastern members will remain on high alert but not directly engaged, using the breather to strengthen their defenses. We can expect continued NATO exercises and force rotations along the eastern flank as a deterrent signal, but also careful calibration to avoid direct clashes with Russia. Meanwhile, Ukraine will persist with its counteroffensive efforts and deep strikes against Russian logistics. Notably, Western intelligence sharing (SIGINT, satellite and HUMINT) will continue to help Ukraine anticipate Russian moves, thereby reducing Putin’s chances of achieving strategic surprise. (Indeed, any major Russian troop buildups would likely be spotted – Western intel famously warned that 175,000 Russian troops were massing before the 2022 invasionsecurityanddefence.pl, and similar transparency would hamper Russia from regrouping unnoticed in a stalemate.)
Internal Political Ramifications: Domestically, a continued stalemate in Ukraine presents a mixed picture for Putin. On one hand, by avoiding risky new operations, Putin minimizes the chance of a dramatic military defeat that could destabilize his regime in the short term. His propaganda can continue to portray the war as a necessary defensive struggle against “NATO aggression,” justifying a protracted campaign. Thus far, the Kremlin’s tight control of the media narrative – and repression of dissent – has prevented any mass anti-war movement from taking hold. However, as casualties mount and economic hardships accumulate, public war-weariness could quietly grow. The lack of clear victories after nearly two years is likely frustrating ultranationalist hawks, while ordinary Russians increasingly feel the war’s impact (from mobilization of reservists to rising prices). Putin risks “war fatigue” setting in among the populace and even within segments of the elite if the conflict remains stalemated with no end in sight. There are hints of this pressure: for example, Russia’s recent fuel shortages and price spikes (a direct result of Ukraine’s strikes) have caused social discontent in some regionsatlanticcouncil.org, forcing the regime to scramble with price controls and censorship of strike newsatlanticcouncil.org. Additionally, the financial strain of the war is mounting – the Kremlin must offer exceptionally high salaries and bonuses to attract contract soldiers for its under-manned armyatlanticcouncil.org, stretching the budget. If Putin continues the war without tangible gains, he may face increasingly difficult trade-offs domestically: cutting other expenditures to fund the war (upsetting parts of the populace), further mobilizations of draftees (risking public anger), or reliance on mercenaries and proxy forces (with uncertain loyalty). In summary, the status quo strategy avoids immediate shocks but carries a slow-burning political risk for Putin: a prolonged war of attrition with no victory could gradually erode the perceived competence and invincibility of his regime. For now, his authoritarian grip and suppression of criticism allow him to sustain this course – but the patience of both the Russian public and power brokers is not unlimited. Putin will have to gauge how long he can maintain a costly stalemate before something snaps, either on the front lines or on the home front.
Scenario 2: Renewed Large-Scale Push in Ukraine
Key Motivations and Triggers: In this scenario, Putin decides to launch a major new offensive in Ukraine in an attempt to break the deadlock. Several factors could trigger this gambit. First, frustration with the stalemate and a desire to regain the initiative may push Putin toward a big move – he knows a drawn-out war carries risks, so a bold strike that delivers a clear victory (for example, capturing the rest of Donbas or a major city like Kharkiv or Odesa) could vindicate the sacrifices and put Ukraine on the back foot. Additionally, Putin might be motivated by perceived weakness or distraction in the West. If Western support for Kyiv looks shaky (e.g. delayed aid due to political gridlock, or hesitation in supplying advanced weapons), the Kremlin could see a window to strike hard before Ukraine is further strengthened. Another potential trigger is new resources at Putin’s disposal: over the past year, Russia has mobilized additional troops, ramped up ammunition production (with help from partners like North Korea and Iran), and conserved armored units – he may judge that by late 2025 he finally has the reserves needed for a concentrated offensive. Indeed, open-source analysts noted that Russian forces significantly reduced their armored vehicle losses in summer 2025, likely by holding back tanks from front-line use; some “estimate” that only ~46% of Russia’s prewar tanks remain and suggest Moscow is conserving armor for a massed offensiverussiamatters.org. If Putin believes these husbanded forces are ready, he could be tempted to unleash them. A further trigger could be political timing: for example, wanting a battlefield success ahead of Russia’s 2024 presidential election (to shore up Putin’s strongman image), or aiming to pre-empt any Ukrainian/NATO breakthroughs by striking first. Finally, Putin might calculate that Ukraine’s army is stretched or vulnerable in a particular sector – say, if Ukrainian brigades are tied up in one offensive, Russia might attempt a surprise attack elsewhere (as it tried around Vuhledar and Avdiivka in early 2023). In summary, a renewed push would be driven by Putin’s gamble that offensive action could achieve what attrition has not – decisive strategic gains or a collapse of Ukrainian resistance – before Western support can respond in kind.
Operational Feasibility: The feasibility of a large Russian offensive in late 2025 is questionable but not impossible. Russia does retain considerable military manpower; after multiple mobilizations, its ground forces in and around Ukraine likely number in the hundreds of thousands. Offensive operations would probably focus on one or two axes where Russia can mass its best remaining units. Possibilities include a renewed thrust in the northeast (toward Kharkiv or deeper into Donetsk oblast), a southern offensive to widen the land bridge to Crimea or threaten Zaporizhzhia, or even a push north from Russian territory to destabilize Kyiv again (though the latter is less likely given past failure). Key feasibility concerns revolve around equipment, logistics, and quality of forces. As noted, Russia’s armored fleet is heavily depleted – if they commit their held-back tanks and IFVs for one big assault, they would have to accept little in reserve. There is evidence Russia has been stockpiling munitions and drones to support a potential surge in firepower (Russian strikes on Ukraine have escalated in frequency and size, indicating ample missile/drone stocksrussiamatters.org). However, a major ground offensive will also require adequate fuel, transport, and supply lines. This is where Ukrainian strategy may constrain Russia: Ukraine’s deep-strike campaign has targeted rail hubs, ammo depots, and fuel storage in Russian territory. By September 2025, those strikes triggered fuel crises and even wholesale gasoline price spikes within Russiaatlanticcouncil.org, hinting at strains in the supply chain. If Russia tries a high-tempo armored assault, fuel shortages or disrupted logistics could quickly stall its momentum. Moreover, Ukraine’s extensive mining and fortifications, especially in the south and east, mean Russian assaults would face formidable prepared defenses (as Ukraine did against Russia’s own defenses). The quality and morale of Russian assault troops is another issue – much of the professional core of the army has been attrited, leaving newly mobilized soldiers with limited training or Wagner-style mercenaries and prison recruits, whose reliability in a complex offensive is dubious. That said, Russian planners might mitigate some issues by attacking in the winter or early spring when hard ground could favor armored movement, or by focusing overwhelming artillery and air strikes on a narrow sector to punch through. Feasibility also depends on surprise and deception: Russia would likely try to conceal force build-ups and strike with little warning. However, the extensive surveillance by Western and Ukrainian intelligence makes achieving surprise difficult – HUMINT and satellite imagery would likely detect large force movements or concentrations before the offensive, as happened when Russia massed ~175,000 troops prior to the 2022 invasion (a fact widely reported by U.S. intelligence)securityanddefence.pl. In sum, while Russia could mount a large offensive on paper, its prospects of success are slim unless the Russian army demonstrates far better coordination and supply than it has so far in this war. The offensive might initially seize some ground by sheer weight, but sustaining a breakthrough and exploiting it before Ukrainian reserves counter-attack would be a tall order.
Strategic Objectives: Putin’s strategic objective with a renewed push would be to alter the balance of the war decisively in Russia’s favor. Ideally, from Moscow’s perspective, a successful offensive would force Ukraine into a crisis – perhaps by capturing a major city, encircling a large portion of Ukraine’s forces, or dramatically expanding Russian control of territory. For example, if Russian forces could overrun the remainder of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts (fulfilling one of the originally stated war goals) or landlock Ukraine by seizing Mykolaiv/Odesa, Putin could declare a major victory. This could pressure Kyiv to sue for peace on Moscow’s terms (recognizing Russian territorial gains, demilitarization, etc.). Even a more limited objective – such as spoiling Ukraine’s own offensive and regaining lost ground in the south (e.g. retaking parts of Kherson or Kharkiv regions that Ukraine liberated) – would be trumpeted by the Kremlin as proof Russia is back on the advance. Additionally, a new offensive might aim to fracture Western support: if the world sees dramatic Russian gains or a looming Ukrainian collapse, some Western leaders might panic and push Ukraine to negotiate to avoid total defeat. Putin’s bet would be that a high-risk offensive, if it yields significant gains, could break the current war paradigm. On an operational level, Russia may also pursue specific goals like destroying Ukraine’s most capable brigades in open battle (thus reducing Ukraine’s future offensive capacity), capturing strategic infrastructure (power plants, rail junctions) to cripple Ukraine’s economy, or driving a wedge between Ukraine’s forces to disrupt their cohesion. Importantly, a large offensive might be accompanied by intensified hybrid operations – e.g., Russian saboteurs might strike critical infrastructure in Ukraine or even in NATO countries to hinder resupply. (Recall that a Russian spy ring was busted in Poland for plotting to derail arms shipmentstheguardian.com; similar sleeper cells or Spetsnaz teams could be activated in a lead-up to an offensive, aiming to paralyze logistics or spread panic.) Another objective is domestic and international signaling: Putin would use an offensive to signal resolve and strength – telling both his domestic critics and foreign adversaries that Russia is far from giving up and is capable of offensive action despite past setbacks. In essence, scenario 2’s objective is to un-freeze the conflict on Putin’s terms: seize the initiative, grab as much advantage as possible, and hope that shock and momentum yield a game-changing result that a stalemate never could.
Predicted Western and Regional Responses: A renewed large-scale Russian attack on Ukraine would be met with swift and significant Western responses – short of direct troop intervention. NATO and Western leaders have invested considerable credibility in Ukraine’s defense; if Putin attempts to overwhelm Ukraine, the West is likely to double down on military aid in emergency fashion. This could include rushing additional advanced systems that may have been delayed: for instance, faster delivery of F-16 fighter jets, more long-range missiles (ATACMS or others), and larger quantities of air defenses to protect Ukrainian cities from the inevitably massive Russian bombardment accompanying any offensive. Washington and European capitals would also likely impose new crushing sanctions in response, attempting to further choke Russia’s war economy. We might see NATO countries dramatically increase intelligence sharing and logistical support – perhaps even assisting with planning Ukraine’s defense in real time. While NATO is not treaty-bound to defend Ukraine, an existential Russian offensive would prompt discussions of red lines; some policymakers could resurrect proposals like a limited no-fly zone over parts of Ukraine or other measures to protect humanitarian corridors. (Notably, after Russian drones strayed into Polish territory, some in Poland even called for a protective no-fly zone over western Ukraine to stop spilloverrussiamatters.org – a Russian offensive might amplify such calls.) Regionally, frontline NATO states (Poland, Romania, the Baltic trio) would almost certainly go into a heightened state of military readiness. Poland in particular, as Ukraine’s key conduit, might start moving additional troops toward its border (both as a precaution and to assist with humanitarian fallout if Ukrainians flee combat zones). It’s also possible these countries would accelerate the transfer of their own Soviet-era tanks and fighters to Ukraine, essentially emptying their stocks, because a decisive phase of the war is at hand. Western public opinion would likely harden in favor of Ukraine if Russia is seen blatantly trying to subjugate more of the country – though Putin might hope for the opposite, history suggests aggression tends to rally support for the victim. One risk is if the Russian offensive initially succeeds wildly, there could be panic about Ukraine’s survival; in that case some Western voices might argue for pressuring Kyiv into a ceasefire to save it from worse fate. However, most NATO governments would view giving in as unacceptable, since it would reward Putin’s aggression and endanger European security long-term. Instead, expect emergency summits among the G7/NATO, new tranches of billions in aid, and possibly contingency plans for worst-case outcomes (like how to support a Ukrainian government-in-exile or insurgency, should the conventional defense falter). In summary, a major Russian offensive would trigger an equally intense Western response to bolster Ukraine – short of NATO entering the war directly, but everything shy of that: more weapons, more sanctions, and more diplomatic isolation for Moscow.
Internal Political Ramifications: Domestically, launching a large new offensive is politically risky for Putin – it ups the ante on an already high-stakes war. If the offensive were to succeed, Putin would reap significant political benefits: he could declare that Russia is “winning” after all, silencing critics in the elite who doubted the war, and bolstering ultra-nationalists’ support. A victory, even a limited one, would be touted as vindication of Putin’s leadership and could be used to justify further mobilization (“we’re on the cusp of total victory, we need everyone’s effort”). It might also distract the public from economic woes through a burst of patriotic fervor. However, if the offensive fails or bogs down with massive casualties – a very real possibility – the domestic fallout could be severe. Putin would then be seen to have squandered lives and equipment for no gain, potentially emboldening factions within the regime to question his competence. The Russian military’s morale, already tested by previous setbacks, could collapse in the face of a bloody failure, leading to infighting or breakdowns in command. A high-profile failure might rekindle dissent at home: families of mobilized soldiers (who have so far been relatively quiet due to repression) could become more vocal as casualties spike. There’s also a risk of elite power struggles. A disastrous offensive might revive tensions similar to those that led to Yevgeny Prigozhin’s brief mutiny in June 2023 – elements of the security apparatus or warlord figures could seek scapegoats for defeat, with blame possibly directed at senior military leadership or even Putin himself. In anticipation of this, Putin would likely tighten domestic controls even further around an offensive: implementing martial law measures, ramping up propaganda about an existential fight against NATO, and cracking down preemptively on any signs of dissent. The Kremlin might also coordinate a domestic propaganda blitz to manage expectations – e.g. framing any offensive as limited and pre-emptive (“we had intelligence the Ukrainians planned to attack first, so we struck”). Still, the uncertainty of war means Putin’s personal survival could be on the line if the gamble backfires catastrophically. It’s often said authoritarian regimes face greatest peril in defeat. Thus, while a bold offensive could theoretically alter the strategic balance, for Putin it represents a high-risk, high-reward roll of the dice. Success could solidify his grip on power; failure could be destabilizing, potentially even setting the stage for regime upheaval. Recognizing this, Putin will weigh this option carefully, and likely only proceed if he feels conditions (both on the battlefield and in managing the home front) are firmly in his favor – or if he grows desperate enough to embrace the peril.
Scenario 3: Conventional Strike or Hybrid Escalation against the Baltic States
Key Motivations and Triggers: This scenario envisions Putin expanding the conflict beyond Ukraine to target the Baltic NATO states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), either through a direct conventional attack or more likely via hybrid aggression. Such a move would be extraordinary, essentially opening a new front against NATO, and would likely be contemplated only under extreme circumstances. Putin’s possible motivations could include: forcing NATO to the bargaining table by demonstrating he’s willing to widen the war, thereby pressuring the West to drop support for Ukraine in exchange for avoiding a larger conflict. He might also be driven by an irredentist or ideological aim to reclaim influence over Russia’s former Soviet republics – the Baltics were part of the USSR and contain Russian-speaking minorities that the Kremlin often claims to protect. A trigger might be if Putin perceives NATO’s resolve as weak or divided. For instance, if a political crisis in the U.S. or Europe leads him to believe NATO might not respond forcefully to a limited strike, he could test the alliance’s commitment. Recent Russian behavior hints at such probing: in September 2025, Russia deliberately flew a swarm of drones into Polish airspace from Belarus, in what analysts called a strategic “test of NATO’s responses” and an attempt to keep border states anxiousrussiamatters.org. If Putin interprets cautious or slow NATO reactions as weakness, it might embolden bolder action. Another trigger could be desperation due to failure in Ukraine – if Putin sees defeat looming there, he might gamble on a “horizontal escalation” by attacking NATO’s periphery, hoping to shock the West into halting the Ukraine war on terms favorable to Russia. Domestically, ultra-hawkish factions could also push the idea that striking NATO in a limited way would “teach the West a lesson”. However, Putin would have to weigh triggering NATO’s Article 5 (collective defense) – a huge deterrent. Therefore, a hybrid approach might seem more attractive: sabotage, subversion, or deniable attacks in the Baltics that stop short of an overt armed invasion. Triggers for hybrid escalation could be comparatively lower: for example, retaliation against the Baltics for their staunch support to Ukraine (all three have supplied weapons and banned Russian propaganda media). If Putin believes he can conduct acts of sabotage or intimidation without clearly crossing NATO’s red line, he may be tempted to do so to unsettle the alliance. In summary, scenario 3’s motivations range from a coercive strategy to alter Western calculus, to revanchist dreams, to reactive punishment. But any move against the Baltics – even hybrid – would be extremely provocative, so it likely hinges on Putin’s perception of NATO’s unity and risk tolerance at a given moment.
Operational Feasibility: A conventional military strike on the Baltic States would face enormous feasibility challenges. The three small Baltic republics are NATO members, meaning Putin would have to expect full-scale war with the United States and Europe if he overtly attacked. Russia’s conventional military is already heavily committed in Ukraine; opening a second conventional front against well-defended NATO territory verges on suicidal from a military standpoint. Geographically, Russia could try a quick land grab such as seizing the Suwalki Corridor (the narrow 65 km strip between Poland and Lithuania that connects the Baltic states to the rest of NATO). This could be launched from Belarus/Kaliningrad to isolate the Baltics. Some war-gaming scenarios suggest Russia might overrun that corridor in a sudden attack, cutting off Estonia/Latvia/Lithuania from land reinforcement for a timelansinginstitute.orglansinginstitute.org. However, maintaining control of it against NATO counterattack would be another matter entirely. NATO forces (including U.S. brigades, multinational battalions stationed in the Baltics, etc.) would immediately engage. Russian forces in Kaliningrad and the Western Military District have also been diminished by rotations to Ukraine, and any units available are far inferior in capability to the combined might of NATO in a protracted fight. Militarily, Russia might achieve temporary local superiority at the very outset, but NATO’s air power and logistics would quickly tip the scale. It’s widely assessed that Russia simply cannot win a conventional war with NATO with its current forces – its only real equalizer would be nuclear weapons, which raises apocalyptic stakes. That stark reality makes a large conventional attack extremely unlikely as a rational course. On the other hand, hybrid or covert operations in the Baltics are quite feasible and have already been happening in peacetime. Russia has extensive intelligence networks and sympathetic or coerced proxies in Europe. We’ve seen repeated incidents of sabotage and subversion: for example, the cutting of undersea data/power cables in the Baltic Sea (one case involved a Russian-linked tanker dragging its anchor to sever cables between Sweden, Finland, and Estonia)theguardian.comtheguardian.com. Russian spy rings have been uncovered mapping Baltic critical infrastructure, and Moscow routinely engages in cyberattacks and GPS jamming in the regioncsis.org. Such hybrid tactics – causing disruption while maintaining deniability – are operationally low-cost for Russia and difficult for targeted states to definitively attribute. A Norwegian intelligence assessment concluded that “any act of sabotage would likely be performed in a manner that makes it challenging to prove who was behind it,” precisely because Russia wants to avoid triggering NATO’s self-defense clausecsis.org. To do this, the Kremlin uses an array of proxies and cut-outs: local Russian-speaking minorities, criminal gangs, private “patriotic” hackers, or front companies, to carry out its biddingcsis.org. In a hybrid escalation scenario, we could imagine sabotage teams pre-positioned near Baltic borders attempting to blow up rail lines, energy grids, or ports used to transit NATO aid to Ukraine. Covert operatives might also attempt targeted assassinations or foment unrest among ethnic Russian communities (for instance, in Estonia’s Narva region) to create a pretext for “protecting” them. These operations are operationally feasible because they exploit peacetime rules and the open societies of the Baltics. Of course, the Baltics are on high alert for such activities – their security services have been actively arresting suspected agents and hardening infrastructure. But as noted, full prevention is hard when attacks can be clandestine and varied (cyber, maritime, etc.). In sum, while a direct Russian military invasion of the Baltics would border on suicidal (and thus is very unlikely short of an irrational last resort), hybrid aggression is already a reality and could be intensified if Putin chooses to broaden the conflict in a deniable way.
Strategic Objectives: The strategic objectives behind attacking the Baltics – overtly or covertly – would center on altering the wider strategic balance in Russia’s favor, albeit through dangerous brinksmanship. If Putin launched an actual conventional strike on one or more Baltic states, the objective might be to shatter NATO’s credibility and unity. By violating NATO territory, Putin would be effectively saying: “I am willing to risk war with you – are you willing to risk war with me?” He may hope that fear of nuclear escalation would make some NATO members hesitate to fully respond, thereby fracturing the alliance. (In essence, the Kremlin would be testing whether NATO’s Article 5 is truly ironclad or just “pieces of paper” – a plot to “kill NATO’s credibility,” as one analysis dubbed Russia’s incursionsrussiamatters.org.) If NATO flinched or responded weakly, Russia would achieve a massive strategic victory: it would undermine the security guarantees that hold the Western alliance together and potentially open the door to Russia re-establishing a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. In concrete terms, Russia could aim to occupy a small part of the Baltics (perhaps a border sliver or a specific city with a large Russian populace) and then pause, essentially holding it hostage to extract concessions. Those concessions might include Ukraine yielding territory or NATO withdrawing certain forces from Eastern Europe. Another objective could be domestic propaganda: demonstrating Russian strength by “defying” NATO could rally patriotic sentiment at home (as long as it doesn’t immediately lead to disaster). However, these objectives are predicated on NATO not responding forcefully – a gamble that likely underestimates NATO’s resolve. In the hybrid escalation track, strategic objectives are more limited but still significant. By conducting sabotage or subversion in the Baltics, Putin aims to destabilize and intimidate those nations and their neighbors. Successful hybrid attacks can erode public confidence in governments (if, say, infrastructure is repeatedly sabotaged), impose economic costs, and divert NATO resources to homeland security tasks. They also serve to remind Europe that Russia can extend the conflict into EU/NATO territory at will unless its interests are respected. For example, blowing up an undersea cable or causing a major power outage in Lithuania could be intended to pressure these countries to think twice about their uncompromising stance on Russia. Strategically, it’s a form of coercive leverage: forcing NATO to devote attention and resources to its own backyard problems, thereby potentially reducing focus on Ukraine. Additionally, Putin might hope to exploit any internal divides within NATO – for instance, if some Western European members see hybrid attacks as “not worth war,” while Eastern members are alarmed and want a tough response, that could sow discord. The ultimate strategic goal of scenario 3 would be to change the game that is currently favoring Ukraine (with steady Western support) by raising the specter of a broader European war. Putin’s gamble is that NATO, fearful of escalation, might pressure Ukraine into a ceasefire or limit their aid in order to avoid provoking Russia further. It’s a high-stakes form of nuclear sabre-rattling by action – using aggression on NATO’s fringe as a bargaining chip. However, this objective carries profound risks, as discussed next.
Predicted Western and Regional Responses: Any Russian aggression against the Baltic states – whether overt or covert – would trigger strong responses from NATO, though calibrated to the nature of the attack. In the case of a conventional military strike on Baltic soil, NATO’s response would almost certainly be immediate military retaliation. Article 5 of the NATO treaty declares that an armed attack on one member is an attack on all, obligating collective defense. In practice, this means NATO forces (led by the U.S., UK, France, Germany and others) would rapidly mobilize to engage Russian forces. We would see a major air campaign against Russian units that entered Baltic territory, and likely strikes on the launching points (for example, suppressing Russian assets in Kaliningrad or Belarus). NATO’s goal would be to expel or neutralize Russian forces in the member state as quickly as possible. There could even be consensus to strike targets inside Russia proper (like military bases supporting the attack), though NATO might initially restrain to avoid uncontrolled escalation. Even countries that historically favor caution (Germany, France) would be compelled by treaty and the existential threat to European security to act. The unity of NATO would be reinforced, not weakened, by a direct attack – as one observer noted, “guarantees are just paper until tested,” and if tested, NATO leaders know failure to respond means the end of the alliancerussiamatters.orgrussiamatters.org. Thus, paradoxically, Putin’s attempt to fracture NATO by force could backfire spectacularly, resulting in a robust allied war effort. Regionally, frontline states like Poland and the Nordics (Finland, Sweden – Sweden likely fully NATO by 2025) would throw everything into defending the Baltics, as they know their own fates would be next. One can also expect global ramifications: countries like Japan or Australia, seeing blatant aggression, might extend material support to NATO; China would face pressure to either rein in Moscow or face a more unified West in the long run. In diplomatic terms, Russia would become a true pariah, possibly even prompting talk of UN action (though Russia’s veto precludes direct UNSC moves). Now, in the event of hybrid attacks (sabotage, cyber, proxy terrorism) that fall below the clear-cut threshold of an “armed attack,” Western responses would be multifaceted. Firstly, the affected states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) would likely invoke Article 4 (consultations) if the harassment is serious, rallying NATO support to address the threat. NATO already treats hybrid attacks with increasing seriousness – one lesson from recent incidents (like unexplained pipeline explosions or drone incursions) is that the alliance is moving toward treating severe hybrid attacks as potentially “cumulative” armed aggression. We would see enhanced counter-sabotage measures: NATO might deploy special counter-intelligence or engineering teams to the Baltics to help guard critical infrastructure (e.g., undersea cable monitoring, protecting rail lines). Cyber defenses would be boosted through NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre (conveniently headquartered in Estonia). Western nations might respond in kind in the cyber domain – for example, conducting offensive cyber operations against Russian networks or assets used in the hybrid strikes. There would also be a legal and diplomatic offensive: publicly attributing blame to Russian security services for the sabotage (if evidence permits) and rallying international condemnation. Sanctions on Russia could be tightened further, specifically targeting individuals or industries linked to the aggression (for instance, sanctioning shipping companies involved in the “shadow fleet” used for undersea sabotagetheguardian.com). Importantly, NATO would likely increase its military posture in the region to deter any further adventurism. Already, after the Polish airspace drone incident, NATO has moved to bolster eastern air defensesrussiamatters.org. Following hybrid attacks, you might see more NATO troops and air policing in the Baltics as a signal. Western intelligence agencies would also redouble efforts to hunt down Russian spy networks – expect arrests and expulsions of undeclared Russian operatives in Europe (something already happening since 2022). The Baltic states themselves have contingency plans to form “resistance networks” and guerrilla forces if occupiedrand.org, and they practice total defense concepts for hybrid war – these would kick into gear, with citizens and local authorities cooperating to thwart Russian subversion. In summary, a Russian hybrid escalation would not cause NATO to shoot back immediately, but it would unify the alliance in increasing resilience and indirectly punishing Moscow. The regional response would be one of heightened vigilance: Finland and Sweden (if not yet in NATO, Sweden would nonetheless coordinate closely) would tighten Baltic Sea security; Poland would likely offer immediate assistance to its Baltic neighbors (like border guards, engineers, etc.). The EU might also play a role, since sabotage of infrastructure (like energy grids, communications) crosses into EU security – collective EU retaliation (sanctions or legal action) could complement NATO’s moves. Ultimately, whether conventional or hybrid, aggression in the Baltics would strengthen Western resolve to stop Putin. If his objective was to intimidate, the result would almost certainly be a more forward-leaning NATO, as indeed NATO officials have warned: ambiguous Russian probes or “accidents” are “deliberately probing for weakness” and must be met with robust unityrussiamatters.org. The Baltics themselves, having long sounded the alarm about Russia, would say “we told you so,” and NATO would heed them. One must assume Putin knows this, which is why any scenario 3 action would likely be limited and deniable – but even that would invite a powerful response in the current climate.
Internal Political Ramifications: Within Russia, the decision to confront the Baltic states – especially overtly – would shift the nation into a full war footing with potentially dire consequences for Putin’s regime. If Putin were to initiate direct conflict with NATO, he would likely frame it as Russia’s “Great Patriotic War II” – an existential struggle forced upon Russia by encroaching Western aggressors. The state propaganda would go into overdrive to rally the population: narratives about NATO attacking Russian compatriots in the Baltics or threatening Kaliningrad would be blared to justify general mobilization. In the very short term, such patriotic fever might rally some public support; Russians historically have a strong rally-around-the-flag response when Motherland is in peril. Putin would probably declare martial law nationwide, convert the economy to a wartime regime, and announce even harsher penalties for dissent (any anti-war voices would be labeled traitors aiding NATO). However, unlike the Ukraine war which the Kremlin still euphemistically calls a “special military operation,” an open war with NATO would be impossible to disguise. Casualties would rise exponentially if Russia trades blows with the West’s militaries. As body bags return and daily life is disrupted (e.g., young men conscripted en masse, consumer goods vanishing due to war), the initial patriotic surge could turn to shock and anger. It is far from certain that the Russian public, who have mostly been kept at arm’s length from the war’s hardships, would stoically endure a full confrontation with NATO. The memory of WWII’s sacrifice is honored, but contemporary Russians have enjoyed relative peace and prosperity for decades; sudden losses could crack the facade of support. Importantly, the Russian elite – oligarchs, bureaucrats, military brass – would be acutely aware that war with NATO is unwinnable. If Putin drags Russia into a catastrophic conflict, elements of his inner circle might contemplate moves to remove him to save themselves and the state from destruction. Even within the security services or military, there could be splits: some zealots might welcome fighting NATO, but many professionals know it’s a doomed cause. The threat of nuclear escalation would hang over everything – Putin might threaten to use nuclear weapons to stave off defeat, which in itself could cause internal panic (e.g., does the chain of command obey such an order?). On the other hand, hybrid aggression against the Baltics, being deniable, offers Putin more control domestically. Since covert attacks can be hidden or plausibly denied, the Russian public might not even know their country is risking direct conflict. This allows Putin to play a double game – intimidating NATO while telling his people that Russia is only defending itself. If a sabotage operation succeeds and isn’t traced conclusively, he avoids domestic repercussions entirely. If it is exposed, he will simply deny it and accuse the West of false-flag operations, which many Russians might believe given state media dominance. Thus, hybrid escalation has minimal immediate political cost internally, apart from potentially escalating sanctions (whose effect on the general populace is gradual and often mitigated by propaganda/blame shifting). In sum, scenario 3 carries enormous domestic risks for Putin if it involves overt military action, risking the very survival of his regime. The more likely hybrid path could achieve some intimidation aims without rallying Russians against him – but even covert warfare isn’t without blowback. Should NATO intelligence present irrefutable evidence of Russian sabotage (for example, captured agents or recordings), Russians might be shocked to find themselves on the brink of world war over Putin’s adventurism. While overt opposition might not manifest (due to fear), discontent within the corridors of power could swell. Putin’s gamble on Baltic escalation would thus be as dangerous at home as it is abroad: success could strengthen his hand by cowing the West, but failure or miscalculation could trigger a spiral leading to domestic destabilization or even the collapse of his regime under the weight of war with the West.
Scenario 4: Military Action Targeting Finland
Key Motivations and Triggers: In this scenario, Russia sets its sights on Finland – a nation with whom it shares an 830-mile border and which, significantly, joined NATO in 2023. Putin’s motivations for targeting Finland overlap with the Baltic scenario in terms of challenging NATO, but there are some Finland-specific factors. Historically, Russian leaders (from the Tsars to the Soviets) were wary of a hostile power on Finland’s soil – hence the Winter War of 1939 and Finland’s “Finlandization” Cold War neutrality. Finland’s accession to NATO was a major strategic setback for Moscow, undermining Putin’s stated goal of halting NATO expansion. Thus, one motive could be revenge or deterrence: to punish Finland for joining NATO and to warn Sweden (and any others) of the costs of aligning against Russia. Russian official rhetoric has turned sharply hostile toward Helsinki. Notably, former president Dmitry Medvedev penned a September 2025 article threatening to erase Finland’s statehood, claiming that conflict with Russia “could lead to the collapse of Finnish statehood forever”euromaidanpress.com. He even resurrected bizarre accusations that Finland’s government are “Nazis” who committed genocide against Russians – the same propaganda playbook Russia used before invading Ukraineeuromaidanpress.comeuromaidanpress.com. This indicates the Kremlin is deliberately stoking rhetoric to justify potential aggression against Finland, much as it did with Ukraineeuromaidanpress.com. A trigger for action might be if Russia perceives Finland is being used as a base for Western military capabilities that threaten Russia’s strategic assets in the High North (e.g., NATO deploying missiles or significant forces in Finland). Another trigger could be a localized border incident that Russia seizes upon. For example, Russia might manufacture a provocation in the Karelian border area or claim that Finnish border guards harmed Russian citizens, then use it as pretext for “limited” action. Internally, ultra-nationalists in Russia might pressure Putin about reclaiming certain Finnish territories lost by the USSR (though mainstream Russian discourse doesn’t usually talk of reconquering Finland, fringe ideologues occasionally reference “Greater Russia” fantasies that include parts of Finland). If Putin’s war in Ukraine continues to falter, he could lash out at Finland as an alternative show of force, calculating Finland might be a “weak link” since it’s new to NATO. That said, directly attacking a NATO member is a high bar, so more subtle triggers have already been observable in hybrid form. One was the weaponization of migrant flows: in late 2023, Finnish authorities accused Moscow of engineering a sudden influx of asylum seekers over the Russian border to pressure Finlandtheguardian.com. Over 900 third-country migrants arrived in one month, causing Finland to temporarily close most border crossings – a clear case of a Russian-orchestrated hybrid provocationcsis.org. Another trigger could be Finnish domestic politics: if a Finnish government took an extremely hard line or, conversely, seemed internally divided, Moscow might see an opportunity to meddle or strike. In summary, Putin’s motive in targeting Finland would be to undermine NATO’s northern flank and reassert Russia’s dominance in the region, driven by resentment of Finland’s NATO move and a desire to show that even NATO membership cannot guarantee security if you’re on Russia’s border. Triggers likely involve either a manufactured crisis at the border or the perception that Russia has a favorable moment (e.g., NATO distracted elsewhere, or Finland’s defenses incomplete in some area).
Operational Feasibility: The feasibility of Russian military action against Finland varies drastically depending on the form – full conventional invasion, limited border attack, or hybrid operations. A full-scale invasion of Finland (reminiscent of the 1939 Winter War) would be an enormous undertaking, likely beyond Russia’s current capabilities while it’s embroiled in Ukraine. Finland’s geography – thick forests, lakes, harsh winter conditions – heavily favors defenders (as the Soviets painfully learned in WWII). Moreover, modern Finland is far better armed and organized than in 1939, with a well-trained conscript-based army, strong reserves, and now the backing of the entire NATO alliance. Russia today would struggle to muster a large, well-equipped force in the Kola/Karelia region for invasion, especially with so much equipment and manpower tied up or lost in Ukraine. Logistics into Finland would be a nightmare; there are few roads through the dense border forests, and Finnish forces would likely conduct a mobile defense, trading space for attrition of Russian units. A more limited conventional strike might be theoretically feasible – for instance, a localized attack to seize a small piece of Finnish territory (perhaps a border town or an island in the Gulf of Finland) to create a propaganda win. But even this would trigger NATO’s Article 5, meaning Russia cannot count on a contained conflict. And unlike the Baltic states which are somewhat geographically exposed, Finland has a long land border directly with Russia, meaning any incursion has no easy cut-off line where Russia could dig in without huge exposure. From a forces perspective, Russia’s Northern Military District has primarily naval and air assets (Northern Fleet) and a few brigades of ground troops; many of those ground units have also been rotated into Ukraine. It’s reported Russia has been expanding some bases near Finland’s border, building tent camps and infrastructure, perhaps to station more troops there in the futuretheguardian.comtheguardian.com. But as of mid-2025, Finnish commanders say the buildup is still “moderate” and “no immediate military threat” has been detectedtheguardian.com. If Russia were to redirect forces from Ukraine to Finland, it would weaken the Ukrainian front – a difficult trade-off. Thus, straight conventional feasibility is low unless something drastically changes (like Russia exiting the Ukraine war and refocusing north – even then NATO would be vigilant). On the hybrid front, however, Russia has already shown both capability and intent. The migrant “crisis” of 2023 demonstrated an ability to apply pressure without troopstheguardian.com. Sabotage operations are also feasible: for example, in October 2023 an undersea gas pipeline and telecom cable connecting Finland and Estonia were mysteriously cut. Investigation pointed to likely Russian involvement (possibly using a commercial vessel or mini-subs). In another case, Finland in early 2024 found and removed suspicious objects on critical rail lines near the Russian border. These kinds of covert actions are feasible and deniable. Airspace incursions are another tool – Russian military aircraft have occasionally tested Finnish air defenses even before Finland joined NATO, and could do so more aggressively to provoke an incident. Also, Russia’s sizeable military presence in the nearby Kola Peninsula (submarine bases, air bases with bombers) provides an umbrella under which they could launch missile strikes at Finland if they chose. For instance, they could fire a limited volley of Iskander ballistic missiles at a Finnish military facility or infrastructure as a “demonstration” strike. This is operationally feasible (within range and capability), though it crosses into overt attack territory and would mean war with NATO. More plausibly, Russia might use the threat of such strikes or forward-deploy tactical nuclear weapons in its Leningrad Oblast or Kaliningrad (though not adjacent to Finland, Kaliningrad nukes threaten the region) as a form of pressure. In summary, conventional feasibility against Finland is low – Russia cannot realistically conquer Finland or even hold significant Finnish territory under NATO’s gaze. Hybrid feasibility is high – Russia can and likely will continue to harass Finland through covert means that sow insecurity, as it requires far fewer resources and avoids pitched battle. Moscow’s playbook for Finland would likely emphasize these asymmetric tactics unless Putin becomes truly irrational or cornered.
Strategic Objectives: By taking action against Finland, Putin’s strategic objectives would be to undermine NATO’s newest member and reinforce Russia’s strategic depth. One clear objective is deterrence by punishment: to show other countries (especially Sweden, which at the time of Finland’s accession was also on the cusp of NATO membership) that joining NATO brings you directly into the Kremlin’s crosshairs. If Russia could make Finland’s life as a NATO member painful, it might dissuade fence-sitters or at least introduce hesitation in NATO’s further expansion or basing decisions. Another objective is to protect Russia’s militarily sensitive areas in the High North – for example, the Kola Peninsula hosts Russia’s Northern Fleet ballistic missile submarines, a core of its nuclear deterrent. Russia might want to push Finland (and NATO) farther back from these areas, perhaps by establishing some kind of buffer zone or just through intimidation making Finland reluctant to host NATO surveillance assets near there. Strategically, attacking Finland (especially overtly) could also serve as a “shock tactic” to force a negotiation in the broader war. Putin may believe that striking a NATO member like Finland – particularly one perhaps perceived as a less central NATO member – could frighten larger NATO powers into seeking an immediate stop to hostilities to avoid further escalation. Essentially, it’s nuclear brinkmanship without immediately using nukes: attack a new member on the periphery and calculate that NATO’s response might be more restrained or politically complicated, thereby driving a wedge into the alliance. (This is speculative, and likely a miscalculation, but could be an objective in Putin’s mind.) On a political level, a move against Finland could aim to boost Putin’s nationalist credentials at home by evoking historical Russian victories – there’s lingering historical sentiment around “defeating the Finns” from WWII (though the Soviets took enormous losses, they did force Finland to cede some territory in 1940). State media could spin any strike on Finland as settling old scores or preempting a Finnish threat to St. Petersburg (which is only ~150 km from the Finnish border). If hybrid tactics are used, the objective might be to make Finland appear vulnerable and unstable, thereby undermining the confidence Finns have in NATO protection and possibly sowing internal debate in Finland about their security choices. For example, cutting power in Helsinki in the dead of winter through sabotage would test Finnish civil resilience and, in the Kremlin’s eyes, perhaps make some Finns question if they’ve antagonized Russia unnecessarily. An overarching Russian aim would be to keep Finland (and Sweden) “second-class” NATO members – meaning, discourage NATO from investing significant military assets there or from relying on them too much, by constantly reminding that Russia can target them. We see evidence of these objectives in the disinformation and propaganda front: Moscow’s narrative now paints Finland’s leaders as Russophobic and even illegitimate (Medvedev absurdly claimed Finland was preparing to annex parts of Russia)euromaidanpress.com. This propaganda sets the stage to justify any future aggression as “defensive” or “preemptive” from Russia’s viewpoint. In summary, whether through overt force or hybrid havoc, Russia’s strategic goal is to erode Finland’s security and western integration, and by extension, to poke a hole in the NATO shield right at Russia’s northern doorstep.
Predicted Western and Regional Responses: If Russia undertook military action against Finland, the Western response would be, as with the Baltics, anchored in NATO’s collective defense obligations. Since Finland is now a NATO member, any armed attack triggers Article 5, committing the alliance to respond. Therefore, a conventional Russian strike on Finland would instantly internationalize into a Russia-vs-NATO war. The predictions for that response mirror those under Scenario 3: NATO would move to defend Finnish territory, likely by deploying forces into Finland, securing Finnish skies, and striking back at Russian launchers or units involved in the attack. The unique geography means NATO reinforcements (for example, U.S. or British rapid reaction units) could enter from Norway or by air/sea via the Baltic, since the direct land route from Central Europe is narrow (Suwalki corridor) or goes through Sweden. It’s almost certain that Sweden – even if somehow not formally in NATO yet – would immediately cooperate, perhaps even invoke Article 5’s spirit if not letter, as Swedish security is intertwined with Finland. The regional Nordic response would be especially strong: Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland (the Nordic NATO members aside from Finland) already have plans for integrated defense with Finland. We would see a rapid formation of a joint Nordic defense effort under NATO command, leveraging their local expertise in Arctic and winter warfare. The U.S. and UK have been training in arctic conditions with Finland; those plans would be activated. In addition to the military response, Western nations would reinforce Finland’s civilian resilience – for example, sending emergency energy supplies if Russia tries to cut off electricity or internet, since much of Finland’s data connectivity runs through undersea cables (which Russia has tampered with beforetheguardian.com). In a hybrid attack scenario (short of open war), Western responses would likely be robust as well, though more nuanced. The EU, which Finland is a member of, has its own mutual assistance clause (Article 42.7 of the EU Treaty) that Finland could invoke if it suffers a grave hybrid attack. That would prompt EU-wide support in various forms. NATO, for its part, treats severe cyber or sabotage attacks on members increasingly seriously. We could expect NATO to send expert teams to Finland: for instance, cyber rapid response teams, or specialists to help repair and secure infrastructure (imagine NATO engineers helping fix a sabotaged pipeline or undersea cable). Allied intelligence sharing with Finland would intensify even beyond the high level it is already – NATO might provide more persistent surveillance (AWACS or drones) along Finland’s border to detect incursions or snap exercises by Russia. Western countries would also coordinate attribution: if evidence links Russia to a hybrid attack, they would present a united front condemning it. Sanctions and diplomatic reprisals would follow: perhaps closing additional Russian consulates or expelling suspected intelligence officers (since Russia often uses diplomatic cover for operatives). Finland’s immediate regional neighbors would help shoulder the burden: e.g., Estonia might route backup electricity or internet to Finland if cables are cut, Norway could send fuel or gas if supplies are disrupted, etc. The Tripwire effect of NATO membership means that even if Russia tries something under-the-radar, NATO states will be inclined to respond collectively to send a message. We might also see creative responses: since Russia is using unconventional means, NATO could reply asymmetrically – for example, conducting very public military exercises in the Baltic Sea or Arctic to remind Russia of NATO’s capabilities, or stepping up covert ops against Russian interests elsewhere (though such actions would be secret). One likely outcome is NATO positioning more permanent forces in Finland over time. Prior to 2022, NATO had no troops there; now, after any Russian provocation, the alliance might decide to station a rotational brigade or air defense units in Finland to deter further aggression. (This would be ironic for Russia, as its aggression would be begetting the very NATO presence it fears.) Within Finland itself, the response to Russian threats would be societal resilience. Finns are known for “sisu,” a national ethos of grit – we’re already seeing Finnish civilians signing up for defense training in large numbers since joining NATOtheguardian.com. In a crisis, Finland can mobilize hundreds of thousands of reserves and has plans to defend with guerrilla tactics if needed. Western support would ensure Finland doesn’t have to stand alone as it did in 1939. Politically, an attack on Finland would erase any lingering debates in Europe about how to handle Russia – it would harden the West’s stance even more. Countries that were on the fence about military spending or aiding Ukraine would likely ramp up both, seeing that Putin’s aggression extends even to neutral neighbors turned allies. In essence, targeting Finland would reinforce Western unity and expand the conflict rather than containing it, just as attacking the Baltics would. It’s worth noting that even hybrid aggression has already prompted action: Finland’s charges against the Russian “shadow fleet” tanker for cable sabotagetheguardian.com led to greater NATO attention on Baltic Sea security, and the migrant pressure incident led Finland to build a 200km border fence to harden its frontiertheguardian.com. These are the kinds of defensive responses Russia’s hybrid forays are eliciting. So, expect more of the same: every Russian move inspires a counter-move by the West to plug gaps and present a united front.
Internal Political Ramifications: Within Russia, conflict with Finland would be framed as an extension of the fight against NATO, with heavy emphasis on historical context. The Kremlin would remind Russians of the Winter War narrative – likely twisting it to claim Russia is once again defending itself from Western-aligned Finnish aggression (in Soviet times, they falsely claimed Finland fired first in 1939; a similar playbook could be used). Initially, a clash with Finland (especially if limited or hybrid) might not drastically change domestic sentiment beyond what a Baltic clash would – it would be seen as part of the larger war with the West that propaganda has already primed the public to accept. However, there are nuances: Finland, unlike the Baltics, was never part of the USSR and does not have a large ethnic Russian population to serve as a pretext. Many Russians also have viewed Finns relatively neutrally or even positively (Finland was a popular tourist and shopping destination for middle-class Russians before 2022). So Putin might have a harder sell convincing the populace that Finland poses a dire threat requiring Russian blood. If casualties start coming in from a Finnish front, Russians may privately question why they are suddenly fighting Finns, who in living memory were not enemies. This could subtly undermine the propaganda narrative that focuses on “denazifying” Ukraine – that narrative doesn’t map cleanly onto Finland, though they would attempt to copy-paste the “Nazi” label onto Finns as Medvedev dideuromaidanpress.com. Over time, a war with Finland (especially if simultaneous with Ukraine) would stretch Russia’s military even thinner, leading to more mobilizations. Each additional draft is a political risk – the initial mobilization in Sept 2022 sparked detectable public panic (thousands fled conscription, some protests flared up before being crushed). If Putin needs to mobilize tens of thousands more for a Finnish front, discontent could rise, particularly among families who feel their sons are being sent to yet another front with no clear rationale. Economically, Russia would further suffer: Finland was one of the last EU countries to maintain a relatively pragmatic tone with Russia pre-2022; war would permanently sever ties, eliminating trade and cooperation that some Russian businesses (like timber, logistics in the north) benefitted from. Domestically, the elite might grow more anxious – attacking a NATO country is a huge escalation that invites disaster; those in Putin’s circle who have something to lose (wealth, international links) will fret that he’s going too far. Finland also shares a border near Russia’s second city, St. Petersburg – a prized cultural center. If war truly broke out, citizens of St. Petersburg would suddenly find themselves near a frontline, which could jolt the urban populace that has until now been distant from the fighting. This proximity might also alarm elites from St. Petersburg (many of Putin’s cadre hail from there) at a visceral level. On the other hand, Putin could attempt to use a conflict with Finland to tighten nationalist fervor: resurrecting World War II imagery of Soviet heroes fighting in the Finnish forests, etc. A quick “victory” – say Russia managed to bully Finland into some concession or temporarily occupied a small piece of territory – would be trumpeted as a strategic triumph over NATO, possibly boosting Putin’s standing among hardliners. But given Finland’s preparedness and NATO’s backing, a Russian military venture there is more likely to stall or fail, which would then amplify domestic criticisms. Even staunch pro-war bloggers might question the wisdom of opening another front. The internal security apparatus would continue to clamp down on any dissent, and anyone questioning the war with Finland would be branded a traitor. Yet the more fronts and enemies Putin creates, the more fragile his domestic situation could become behind the scenes. In essence, scenario 4 would exacerbate the same domestic risks as scenario 3: the specter of an unwinnable multi-front war and the potential that the coalition of elites and public acquiescence holding Putin in power could fracture under the stress. Finland is a tough adversary; a bloody nose or protracted clash there could puncture the myth of Russian military resurgence that Putin might try to portray. As a result, he’d likely prefer covert subversion against Finland to avoid rallying sympathy for Finland domestically or risking an outright debacle that Russians can’t ignore.
Conclusion: Likely Courses and Impact on the Strategic Balance
Each of the four scenarios above carries its own risks and potential rewards for Putin – and each would impact the strategic balance in different ways. Maintaining the status quo in Ukraine (Scenario 1) appears to be the most likely near-term course, given its relative safety for the Kremlin. It means a continued grind with no sudden shocks: Putin avoids gambling on unpredictable escalations, hoping instead that time will tilt the war in Russia’s favor. This scenario, however, is also the least likely to change the strategic balance. A prolonged stalemate essentially freezes the current balance of power, barring a slow, incremental shift as one side’s economy or morale erodes. For now, the West shows determination to support Ukraine and Ukraine shows will to resist – so the status quo could simply perpetuate a bloody impasse. It might eventually wear down Ukraine or, conversely, lead to a breaking point in Russia’s capacity, but it offers no immediate strategic transformation. Putin may favor it due to fewer immediate risks, but it fails to solve his core problem (Ukraine drifting ever closer to the West and not under Moscow’s control).
A renewed Russian large-scale offensive in Ukraine (Scenario 2), while risky, is the option that could most directly alter the military balance within Ukraine. If successful (a big “if”), it could reverse recent Ukrainian gains or even hand Russia new territorial conquest, potentially forcing a shift in momentum and negotiations on Moscow’s terms. Conversely, a failed offensive could dramatically weaken Russia’s position, squandering men and materiel and inviting a effective Ukrainian counterattack that breaks through Russian lines. In other words, Scenario 2 has a high variance: it could either break the stalemate or break Russia’s army. Given indications that Russia is conserving forces for a potential offensiverussiamatters.org, we cannot rule out that Putin will try this path if he sees an opportunity – for example, if he believes Western support is wavering or if a new influx of conscripts is ready. Should it happen, this scenario would most directly impact the war’s trajectory in 2024: either by escalating fighting to a crescendo or by setting the stage for either side’s collapse. It’s arguably the scenario with the most immediate implications for Ukraine’s fate, and thus the strategic balance in Eastern Europe.
Scenarios 3 and 4 (escalation against NATO states) are far less likely because Putin, for all his belligerence, has so far shown caution about direct war with NATO. They represent a dramatic widening of the conflict. If Putin were to strike the Baltic states or Finland, even in a limited/hybrid way, it would indeed alter the strategic balance – but almost certainly against Russia. A conventional attack on NATO territory would activate NATO’s full weight, resulting in Russia facing a militarily superior coalition that could decisively defeat Russian conventional forces, a scenario that might even threaten Putin’s regime survival. Thus, a broad consensus among analysts is that Putin is deterred from this by the existential dangers it poses to Russia itself. Hybrid aggression is more likely, and we are already seeing it: covert sabotage, airspace incursions, and information warfare aimed at NATO’s eastern flank. These hybrid actions can raise tensions and force NATO to divert resources, but by themselves they do not fundamentally change the strategic balance – rather, they are supplemental pressure. Indeed, the cumulative effect of Russia’s hybrid campaign so far has been to strengthen NATO’s unity and defenses (for example, NATO countries have heightened infrastructure protection and stood up new counter-hybrid strategiesrussiamatters.org). The Baltic states and Finland have also doubled down on defense preparations (Finland building border fences, Baltic nations hardening their grids and ports). So, paradoxically, scenario 3 or 4 actions could backfire, making NATO more vigilant and cohesive, thereby diminishing Russia’s leverage in the long run. The only scenario in which attacking NATO might “work” for Putin is a very narrow one where NATO somehow does not respond – an outcome that would require a level of Western disarray that currently seems improbable. Nevertheless, if one of these scenarios did occur (say a limited Russian seizure of a sliver of Baltic territory or a one-off strike on Finland), it would overnight transform the European security order. NATO would shift from proxy support of Ukraine to direct warfighting against Russia. That would be the most profound strategic shift of all – effectively marking the start of a Russia-NATO war with incalculable consequences (up to and including nuclear use). This is why those scenarios, while game-changing, are also extremely unlikely absent a complete miscalculation by Putin about NATO’s resolve.
Weighing the options, Scenario 1 (continuing the current standoff) emerges as Putin’s default strategy, at least in the short term, as it carries the lowest immediate risk. Scenario 2 (a big push in Ukraine) is the most plausible “escalatory” move Putin might attempt if he grows impatient or sees a window of opportunity – it directly targets the stalemate in Ukraine, which is the centerpiece of the conflict. The open-source indicators we have (Russian force conservation, production of drones, etc.) suggest Putin is preparing for the possibility of such an offensiverussiamatters.orgrussiamatters.org, even if he hasn’t pulled the trigger yet. If any scenario is likely to significantly alter the strategic balance on the ground in the coming months, it is scenario 2 – for better or worse. Scenarios 3 and 4 remain contingency nightmares – unlikely unless Putin becomes truly desperate or believes (perhaps mistakenly) that NATO will not react. They would certainly alter the strategic balance by widening the war beyond Ukraine, but almost certainly to Russia’s detriment.
In conclusion, Putin’s most probable course is to stick with the grinding status quo, punctuated perhaps by a cautious offensive thrust in Ukraine if conditions seem favorable. This path seeks to slowly weaken Ukraine while avoiding gambles that could trigger NATO intervention. However, this also means the broader strategic balance – Russia locked in a attritional war against a strengthening Ukraine backed by the West – remains largely unchanged. Short of an unforeseen collapse of one side’s will, the stalemate could persist well into 2024. On the other hand, if Putin does roll the dice on a dramatic escalation, the ramifications would be immediate and far-reaching: a massive Russian offensive in Ukraine would determine victory or defeat in that theater, whereas an attack on NATO territory would expand the conflict in ways that could prove ruinous for Russia. Among all the scenarios, a renewed Ukrainian-focused offensive (Scenario 2) is the one to watch as the pivot that could either break the deadlock or accelerate Russia’s weakening. The Baltic and Finland scenarios, while less likely, underscore the gravity of Putin’s overall strategic predicament: any move outside Ukraine risks widening the war beyond Russia’s control, which is why he has so far mostly relied on hybrid mischief in those areas.
As of now, Putin appears to be testing and prodding at the margins – **sending drones into NATO airspace as probesrussiamatters.org, orchestrating sabotage in European infrastructuretheguardian.com – but stopping short of direct conventional clashes. These actions keep pressure on the West and signal that Putin could escalate, without forcing NATO’s hand. In essence, he is employing a form of coercive signaling: trying to scare NATO with the possibility of scenarios 3 or 4 so that they reconsider their support for Ukraine. The West’s challenge is to maintain resolve and not be cowed by such signals. So far, NATO has responded by bolstering defenses and reiterating commitments, indicating the alliance is aware of Putin’s ploys and determined not to blinkrussiamatters.orgrussiamatters.org.
Ultimately, the current strategic balance – a stalemated but contained Russia-Ukraine war with NATO backing Ukraine – will remain unless one of these scenarios comes to pass. Scenario 1 sustains that balance (grinding attrition). Scenario 2 offers the clearest chance to alter it on the battlefield (depending on the offensive’s outcome). Scenarios 3 and 4 would alter it by broadening the conflict, but are akin to opening Pandora’s box, likely leading to outcomes disastrous for Russia’s strategic position. If Putin’s goal is to improve Russia’s strategic standing, his best bet in the near term is trying for gains in Ukraine (however costly) rather than tangling with NATO directly. Any escalation beyond Ukraine’s borders is more likely to harden the united Western front against him, thereby diminishing Russia’s strategic outlook.
In sum, while Putin retains several military options, each comes with steep trade-offs. The stalemate in Ukraine endures because it is, for now, the devil Putin knows. Yet pressure will mount in Moscow for some progress – at which point an offensive in Ukraine (Scenario 2) could become tempting despite the risks. That is the scenario to monitor closely as a potential inflection point in this war. The West, meanwhile, must stay alert to the more extreme scenarios: even if unlikely, any sign of Russian moves toward the Baltic region or Finnish border should be taken with utmost seriousness, as miscalculation there could lead to a wider war that no one wants. For the foreseeable future, Putin’s military options will continue to be a balancing act between trying to break the stalemate and avoiding breaking Russia in the process. The world watches anxiously to see which path he chooses, for the course of the Ukraine war – and European security at large – hangs in the balance.
Sources: brookings.edurussiamatters.orgrussiamatters.orgrussiamatters.orgatlanticcouncil.orgatlanticcouncil.orgtheguardian.comsecurityanddefence.plrussiamatters.orgrussiamatters.orgtheguardian.comtheguardian.comcsis.orgcsis.orgtheguardian.comeuromaidanpress.comeuromaidanpress.comtheguardian.com
Some dates are old (2024) but this seems a good breakdown and assessment to me. Thank you!