Poland tightens the eastern air picture. Lublin Airport (LUZ) closed under a state-security TFR; Polish military confirms PL/NATO aviation ops over eastern Poland tied to Russian UAV activity across the UA border. Sirens reported in the east; civil flights divert to Warsaw.
Barents goes “hot” for Zapad-2025. Russian Navy conducts landings at Franz Josef Land; Northern Fleet subs & surface groups deploy. Olénya bomber hub shows Tu-160/Tu-95MS/Tu-22M3 on deck; MiG-31 patrols with ballistic-missile loadouts over the Barents.
Kaliningrad signals. Video shows Iskander road-mobile launcher on a Kaliningrad highway near the Polish border—consistent with dispersal/readiness drills.
What’s new in the last cycle
Poland / eastern flank
LUZ closed for “unplanned military activity related to state security”; diversions to WAW noted. Polish military says PL/NATO fighters are active due to Russian drone routes in W. Ukraine. Air-raid siren clips circulating from eastern voivodeships.
Atlas Air B747 (mil airlift contractor) tracked inbound to LUZ prior to closure, consistent with logistics activity.
Romania
ROAF F-16s scrambled from Fetești for a drone incursion on the Danube corridor; official note confirms interception/monitoring in national airspace. (Treat claims of a shoot-down as unconfirmed pending MoD text.)
Kaliningrad
Iskander (SS-26) TEL filmed on public road network. Likely readiness posture/dispersal drill during Zapad; range arcs cover NE Poland, Baltic ports, and airbases.
Barents & High North
Franz Josef Land: marines/vehicles ashore; large exclusion NOTAMs and sea closures active across the Barents approaches.
Olénya Air Base (Kola): visual count indicates 1×Tu-160, 1×Tu-95MS, ~28×Tu-22M3 present in the last pass; several Backfires flew training pairs at ~1,000 m AGL (simulated employment).
MiG-31 patrols (incl. Kinzhal-capable variants) flew extended sorties over neutral Barents waters with ballistic-missile loadouts.
NATO ISR: E-3 AWACS (NATO20) repeatedly on-station off Norway; US RC-135 and P-8A activity up along the Norwegian/Barents perimeters.
EW / Navigation
FR24 interference heatmaps (8–12 Sep) show persistent GNSS disruption bands from the Gulf of Finland → Baltic Proper → S. Sweden/Denmark approaches, with intensified cells off Kaliningrad and across the Kola–White Sea axis.
NOTAM picture (Russia)
Murmansk–Kola/Barents: layered, long-duration danger areas offshore and over the White/Barents Seas; additional boxes along Severomorsk–Olénya.
Gulf of Finland / Leningrad MD: dense low/medium-altitude boxes from Kronstadt to the Narva–Luga line and down the Karelia corridor—typical of air-defense & missile exercises, plus UAV/test corridors.
Kaliningrad AO: episodic coastal and inland boxes consistent with SAM/missile range workups and Iskander/STC drills.
Assessment
Objective: Russia is pressure-testing NATO air policing and response timelines while Zapad-2025 runs a north–south script (Barents → Baltics), pair-matching air/missile drills with UAV salvos against Ukraine that force allied CAPs and TFRs on the flank.
Barents: The Northern Fleet is the main effort this phase; Olénya bomber dispersal plus MiG-31(K) presence is calibrated signaling toward Norway/North Atlantic SLOCs. Expect more ASW/ISR saturation by NATO.
Baltics: The Iskander road move and thick Leningrad MD NOTAMs suggest a live-fire/quick-reaction vignette aimed along the Narva–Gulf of Finland–Kaliningrad triangle—deterrent messaging rather than pre-assault staging.
Poland/Romania: Recurring cross-border UAV intrusions (or debris) will keep CAP windows open and civil TFRs pulsing. This is below-Article-5 friction, but it carries accident/escalation risk if a warhead impacts inside NATO territory.
Risks & short-term probabilities (next 72h)
Recurrent sirens/TFRs in Lublin/Podkarpackie: 70%.
UAV debris/stray crossing into PL or RO territory: 20–25% (depends on RU routing & intercept geometry).
Further diversions to WAW/RZE as CAP windows open/close: 60%.
Additional North Atlantic Council session(s) continuing Article 4 consultations (not a new invocation): 60%.
Article 5 discussion absent casualties/attributed strike on NATO soil: <15%.
Indicators to watch
New Barents danger areas or missile-hazard NOTAMs extending west of Bear Island.
Olénya/Monchegorsk ramp density changes (e.g., Tu-22M3s cycling forward to Severomorsk-3).
Kaliningrad rail/highway movements of 9K720 (Iskander) and S-300/400 to coastal belts.
GNSS jamming spikes across Helsinki–Tallinn–Stockholm corridors.
POL/Romania CAP extensions (look for L-band tanker tracks and AWACS racetracks).
Confidence: Moderate (multi-source visual/ADS-B/NOTAMs & official snippets). Where claims lack primary MoD text (e.g., shoot-down assertions), treated as unconfirmed.