Baltic–Nordic PNT (GPS/GNSS) interference: 8→11 Sep trend

What the tiles show

Heat intensifies from moderate (8 Sep) to widespread high (11 Sep) across the central Baltic Sea, with lobes over:

Kaliningrad → Gdańsk Bay → N Poland

Gulf of Finland axis (Finland’s south coast toward St. Petersburg/Luga)

Patches along Lithuania/Latvia/Belarus borders and into SE Poland.

How to interpret it

FR24’s layer reflects airframe-reported GNSS degradation (jamming/spoofing). The step-up coincides with:

Zapad-25 EW activity corridors (Belarus + Western Military District).

Russia’s Leningrad MD posture (Luga/Ust-Luga/St. Pete) and Baltic Fleet emitters.

NATO’s surge in ISR/CAP and Poland’s counter-UAV ops.

The northward growth (10–11 Sep) toward the Gulf of Finland suggests maritime + shore-based EW coverage shaping a buffer around LMD lines of approach.

Operational implications

Air safety/civil aviation: Expect more NOTAMs for PBN/RNP reliability drops, re-routes over the Baltic, and ADS-B/MLAT anomalies.

Counter-UAV: Elevated jamming along PL/LT and Gulf of Finland tracks will complicate SATNAV-guided UAV nav; Russia likely trying to degrade cueing for both Ukrainian deep-strike drones (e.g., Ust-Luga) and NATO intercept geometry.

NATO posture: The pattern aligns with the AWACS/RC-135/P-8 coverage you shared—ISR is probing EW lobes and mapping emitter behavior in real time.

Scenario read-through

Narva / Finland pressure: ↑ High. The strongest northward expansion sits on the Gulf of Finland axis—consistent with an LMD-centric coercive posture and ISR denial ahead of any snap moves.

Suwalki Belt: ↑ Moderate. Persistent red tiles over Kaliningrad–Gdańsk–N Poland match a gray-zone/EW shield rather than overt ground prep, but it keeps the corridor “thick” for drones and navigation.

Polish airspace defense vs Shaheds: Expect higher intercept costs and more radar/IR reliance as GNSS reliability degrades at night along the PL–BY/UA rim.

Caveats

Heatmaps are report-density biased (busy air lanes look “hotter”). Treat as indicative, not a calibrated EW power map.

Spoofing vs jamming differentiation isn’t shown; some tiles can be receiver-side filtering artifacts.

What to watch next (24–48h)

EASA/CAA advisories for the Baltic FIRs; maritime GPS disruption notices from Sweden/Finland/Poland.

Additional EW blooms coincident with Belarus UAV corridors or Kaliningrad naval activity.

ISR loiter shifts (AWACS orbits edging north/east; RC-135 repeats on the same racetracks).

Any GNSS outages ashore (ports: Ust-Luga, Primorsk, Baltiysk, Gdańsk/Gdynia)—good tell for maritime EW.