3 scenarios to 16 Sep (Zapad - Article 4 week)
What comes after Article 4? An early Article 4 is a good and important start.
WOPR highlights we are on a knife edge. Closer to a major European War than ever before. The direction now depends on Strong United Messaging from NATO. Without it - option C continues as before. An early Article 4 is a good and important start. Hopefully it will continue.
A) Article 4 + allied pressure → Russian de-escalation/withdrawal (from Belarus’ forward areas)
Probability: ~35%
Allied moves (now–12 Sep): NAC meets; more AWACS/tankers; Poland/LTU get Patriot/NASAMS surge and tighter air policing. Quiet bilateral signals to Minsk/Moscow that any new violation triggers cross-border intercept authority and sanctions snapbacks.
Russian moves: Scale drone flight-lines away from the PL border, pause nuisance flights from Belarus, keep Zapad mainly on training areas.
Indicators: Fewer tracks into NW Ukraine; no new Polish airport ground-stops; toned-down Belarus TV rhetoric; fewer RuAF flights in Kaliningrad FIR.
Result by 16 Sep: Drills end with messaging; no Suwałki activity, Article 4 concludes with a communique + longer NATO air-defence rotation.
B) Protracted standoff, no more incursions—but no pullback
Probability: ~45% (most likely)
Allied moves: Same reinforcements; border closures to Belarus stay; standing ROE to shoot drones approaching PL airspace.
Russian moves: Keep Zapad-2025 tempo, GPS jamming and cyber/sabotage pressure in Baltics/Poland; Shahed routes stay close to the border but are flight-planned to avoid NATO airspace.
Indicators: Recurring air-raid nights in Lviv oblast, but Polish NOTAMs are shorter; steady EW interference in Baltic/Polish air corridors; lots of propaganda about “Polish aggression,” no armor road-marches toward the Suwałki axis.
Result by 16 Sep: Tense but contained; Article 4 yields persistent NATO posture (extra Patriots/ISR) through October.
C) Escalation toward 16 Sep → Suwałki Move or pressure operation
Probability: ~20% (low, but non-trivial during Zapad)
Allied moves: Activate additional VJTF/brigade alerting in Poland/Lithuania; maritime MDA tightens in Baltic; selective pre-positioning in NE Poland.
Russian moves: A few more deliberate drone intrusions to probe ROE; rail/road movements in Kaliningrad & Grodno; Belarus/Russia stage “provocation response” drills near borders; more intense GNSS jamming over the Baltic Sea.
Indicators (watchlist):
Repeated airport closures in SE Poland two or more nights in a row.OSINT of Battalion Tactical Groups or artillery dispersal west of Grodno / within Kaliningrad’s 11th Army Corps.Belarus announces border “counter-terror” zones along PL/LT.
Result by 16 Sep: A demonstrative ground maneuver short of crossing NATO borders (engineers, EW, artillery positioning), aggressive air/ISR push, and a sharp NATO air-defence and ground posture upgrade in the corridor. Still <Article 5, but the margin narrows.
Bottom line
With Article 4 in motion and the raid geometry you shared, B is the base case: tense air nights, no repeat incursion if Moscow wants to avoid allied unity.A becomes likelier if Minsk signals restraint and Kremlin propaganda cools.C needs visible ground indicators; if two or more appear, shift to high alert for 15–16 Sep around Suwałki.